

HUBBARD COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE  
Saint Hill Manor, East Grinstead, Sussex

HCO POLICY LETTER OF 15 MAY 1970  
Issue II

Remimeo

*Data Series 5*

**INFORMATION COLLECTION**

It is a point of mystery how some obtain their information. One can only guess at how they do it and looking at results wonder if it is actually done at all.

*Obtaining* information is necessary for any analysis of data.

If one obtains and analyzes *some* information he can get a hint of what information he should obtain in what area. By obtaining *more* data on that area, he can have enough to actively handle.

Thus how one obtains information becomes a very important subject.

Nations have whole mobs of reporters sent out by newspapers, radio, TV and magazines to collect information. Politicians go jaunting around collecting information. Whole spy networks are maintained at huge expense to obtain information.

The Japanese in the first third of the 20th century had two maxims: "Anyone can spy." "Everyone must spy." The Germans picked this up. They had their whole populations at it. The Russian KGB numbers hundreds of thousands. CIA spends billions. M16 well, you get the idea.

It is not amiss, however, to point out that those 2 nations that devoted the most effort to espionage (Japan and Germany) were BOTH DEFEATED HORRIBLY.

Thus the QUANTITY of data poured in is not any guarantee of understanding.

Newspapers today are usually devoted to propaganda, not news. Politicians are striving to figure out another nation's evil intentions, not to comprehend it.

The basic treatise on data collection and handling used to found the US intelligence data system ("Strategic Intelligence") would make one laugh— or cry.

All these elaborate (and expensive) systems of collecting information are not only useless, they are deluding. They get people in plenty of trouble.

A copy of *Time* magazine (US) analyzed for outpoints runs so many out points per page when analyzed that one wonders how any publication so irrational could continue solvent. And what do you know! It is going broke!

Those countries that spend the most on espionage are in the most trouble. They weren't in trouble and then began to spend money. They began to spy and then got into trouble!

News media and intelligence actions are not themselves bad. But irrational news media and illogical intelligence activity are psychotic.

So information collection can become a vice. It can be overdone.

If one had every org in a network fill out a thousand reports a week, he would not obtain much information but he sure would knock them out of comm.

There *is* a moderate flow of information through any network so long as it is within the capability of the comm lines and the personnel.

Thus we get a rule about collecting data in administrative structures.

NORMAL ADMIN FLOWS CONTAIN ENOUGH DATA TO DO A DATA AND SITUATION ANALYSIS.

And

THE LESS DATA YOU HAVE THE MORE PRECISE YOUR ANALYSIS MUST BE.

And

INDICATORS MUST BE WATCHED FOR IN ORDER TO UNDERTAKE A SITUATION ANALYSIS.

And

A SITUATION ANALYSIS ONLY INDICATES THE AREA THAT HAS TO BE CLOSELY INSPECTED AND HANDLED.

Thus, what is an “indicator?”

An *indicator* is a visible manifestation which tells one a situation analysis should be done.

An indicator is the little flag sticking out that shows there is a possible situation underneath that needs attention.

Some indicators about orgs or its sections would be — dirty or not reporting or going insolvent or complaint letters or any non-optimum datum that departs from the ideal.

This is enough to engage in a data and situation analysis of the scene where the indicator appeared.

The correct sequence, then, is:

1. Have a normal information flow available.
2. Observe.

3. When a bad indicator is seen, become very alert.
4. Do a data analysis.
5. Do a situation analysis.
6. Obtain more data by direct inspection of the area indicated by the situation analysis.
7. Handle.

An incorrect sequence, bound to get one in deep trouble, is:

- A. See an indicator.
- B. Act to handle.

This even applies to emergencies IF ONE IS FAST ENOUGH TO DO THE WHOLE CORRECT CYCLE IN A SPLIT SECOND.

Oddly enough anyone working in a familiar area CAN do it all in a split second.

People that can do it like lightning are known to have “fast reaction time.”

People who can't do it fast are often injured or dead.

Example of an emergency cycle: Engineer on duty, normal but experienced perception. Is observing his area. Hears a hiss that shouldn't be. Scans the area and sees nothing out of order but a small white cloud. Combines sight and hearing. Moves forward to get a better look. Sees valve has broken. Shuts off steam line.

Example of an incorrect action. Hears hiss. Pours water on the boiler fires.

### **ADMIN CYCLE**

When you slow this down to an admin cycle it becomes very easy. It follows the same steps.

It is not so dramatic. It could string out over months unless one realized that the steps 1 to 7 should be taken when the first signs show up. It need not. How ever, it sometimes does.

Sometimes it has to be done over and over, full cycle, to get a full scene purring.

Sometimes the “handle” requires steps which the area is too broken down to get into effect and so becomes “Handle as possible and remember to do the whole cycle again soon.”

Sometimes “handle” is a program of months or years duration, its only liability that it will be forgotten or thrown out before done by some “new broom.”

### **DATA COLLECTION**

But it all begins with having a normal flow of information available and OBSERVING. Seeing a bad indicator, one becomes alert and fully or quickly finishes off the cycle.

### **BAD INDICATOR**

What is a “bad indicator” really?

It is merely an outpost taken from the 5 primary outposts.

It is not “bad news” or “entheta” or a rumor. The “bad news” could easily be a falsehood and is an outpost because it is false bad news!

“Good” news when it is a falsehood is an outpost!

### **RELIABLE SOURCE**

Intelligence services are always talking “reliable sources.” Or about “confirmed observation.”

These are not very valuable ways of telling what is true. The master double spy Philby who as a head MI6 adviser was a Russian spy. Yet for 30 years he determined “reliable sources” for the US and England!

If three people tell you the same thing, it is not necessarily a fact as they might all have heard the same lie. Three liars don’t make one fact—they make three outposts.

So it would seem to be *very* difficult to establish facts if leading papers and intelligence services can’t do it!

Yes, it is tough to know the truth.

But the moment you begin to work with them, it is rather easy to locate outposts.

You are looking for outposts. When they are analyzed and the situation is analyzed by them, you then find yourself looking at the truth if you follow the cycle (1) to (7).

It’s really rather magical.

If you know thoroughly what the 5 primary outposts are, they leap into view from any body of data.

Oscar says he leads a happy married life. His wife is usually seen crying. It’s an outpost—a falsehood.

The Omaha office is reported by Los Angeles to be doing great. It fails to report. The LA datum does not include that it is 6 months old. Three outposts, one for time, one for falsehood, one for omitted datum.

Once you are fully familiar with the 5 primary outpoints, they are very obvious.

“We are having pie for supper” and “We have no flour” at least shows out of sequence!

It is odd but all the “facts” you protest in life and ridicule or growl about are all one or another of the outpoints.

When you spot them for what they are, then you can actually estimate things. And the pluspoints come into view.

L. RON HUBBARD  
Founder

LRH:nt.rd.nf  
Copyright © 1970 by L. Ron Hubbard  
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED